CMMC Phase 2 suspended July 13, 2026 — NIST SP 800-171 Rev 2 obligations remain in forceView Program Status
NIST SP 800-171 control family

System and Communications Protection (SC) — NIST SP 800-171

NIST 800-171 SC family: 16 requirements, 42 SPRS points, and FIPS-validated cryptography 3.13.11 — DIBCAC's most-failed requirement.

Key facts
  • 16 requirements, 3.13.1–3.13.16
  • 42 SPRS points at risk
  • FIPS cryptography 3.13.11 is DIBCAC failure #1
  • 3.13.11 is the only requirement above one point that may be deferred

System and Communications Protection is the second-largest family in NIST SP 800-171 and the home of the most-failed requirement in DCMA DIBCAC data: 3.13.11, FIPS-validated cryptography. Its sixteen requirements cover network boundaries, segmentation, encryption in transit and at rest, key management and a set of specific technologies.

It is where architecture decisions — enclave or whole network, which cloud, which VPN — turn into points.

What the System and Communications Protection family covers

System and Communications Protection contains 16 requirements, numbered 3.13.1 to 3.13.16 in NIST SP 800-171 Revision 2. In CMMC Level 2 they carry the practice prefix SC.L2, so 3.13.1 appears as SC.L2-3.13.1.

The family spans boundary protection and architecture (3.13.1–3.13.6), remote and session controls (3.13.7, 3.13.9), cryptography (3.13.8, 3.13.10, 3.13.11, 3.13.16), specific technologies such as collaborative devices, mobile code and VoIP (3.13.12–3.13.14), and session authenticity (3.13.15). Boundary choices are discussed in CMMC enclave vs GCC High.

RequirementWhat it requiresSPRS pointsPOA&M
3.13.1Monitor, control and protect communications at external and key internal boundaries5No
3.13.2Employ architectural designs, development techniques and engineering principles that promote security5No
3.13.3Separate user functionality from system management functionality1Eligible
3.13.4Prevent unauthorized and unintended information transfer via shared system resources1Eligible
3.13.5Implement subnetworks for publicly accessible components, separated from internal networks5No
3.13.6Deny network traffic by default and allow by exception5No
3.13.7Prevent remote devices from split tunneling1Eligible
3.13.8Implement cryptographic mechanisms to prevent unauthorized disclosure of CUI during transmission unless otherwise protected3No
3.13.9Terminate network connections at the end of sessions or after a defined period of inactivity1Eligible
3.13.10Establish and manage cryptographic keys1Eligible
3.13.11Employ FIPS-validated cryptography when used to protect the confidentiality of CUI5 (3 if partial)Only if encryption is not FIPS-validated
3.13.12Prohibit remote activation of collaborative computing devices and indicate devices in use1Eligible
3.13.13Control and monitor the use of mobile code1Eligible
3.13.14Control and monitor the use of Voice over Internet Protocol technologies1Eligible
3.13.15Protect the authenticity of communications sessions5No
3.13.16Protect the confidentiality of CUI at rest1Eligible

Point values from the DoD Assessment Methodology v1.2.1. POA&M eligibility under 32 CFR 170.21.

What it costs you in SPRS points

The family puts 42 of the 313 deductible points in the SPRS score at risk. The five-point requirements are 3.13.1, 3.13.2, 3.13.5, 3.13.6, 3.13.11 and 3.13.15. 3.13.8 is worth three points. The remaining 9 are worth one point each.

3.13.11 has partial credit: five points if CUI is not encrypted, three if it is encrypted with a module that is not FIPS-validated. It is also the only requirement worth more than one point that may be placed on a POA&M — but only in that partially implemented state.

Why 3.13.11 is the most-failed requirement

FIPS validation applies to the cryptographic module, not the algorithm. A product using AES-256 is not compliant unless its module holds a current certificate from NIST's Cryptographic Module Validation Program under FIPS 140-2 or 140-3, and unless it is running in the validated mode. Assessors ask for the certificate numbers.

Organizations fail by citing algorithms instead of modules, by using FIPS-capable products with FIPS mode disabled, or by overlooking places CUI is encrypted: backups, email, file transfer tools, mobile devices and cloud services. The fix starts with an inventory of every place CUI is encrypted and the module used in each — see technical implementation.

Implementation priorities for SC

Draw the boundary first, because every other SC requirement is applied at it. Implement deny-by-default firewall rules and a separate subnetwork for anything publicly accessible. Then inventory every place CUI is encrypted and record the module and certificate number, enabling FIPS mode where needed. Disable split tunneling on the VPN. Finish with session termination, key management procedures and the device-specific controls for collaborative devices, mobile code and VoIP.

What you can and cannot defer

Under 32 CFR 170.21 only one-point requirements may be placed on a POA&M, with the single exception of 3.13.11 when encryption exists but is not FIPS-validated. In this family that makes 3.13.3, 3.13.4, 3.13.7, 3.13.9, 3.13.10, 3.13.12, 3.13.13, 3.13.14 and 3.13.16 eligible for deferral.

Nine one-point requirements and the 3.13.11 partial-credit case are deferrable. The boundary and deny-by-default requirements (3.13.1, 3.13.6) are five-pointers and must be in place.

Evidence assessors expect

Assessors work at the level of the objectives in NIST SP 800-171A and use examine, interview and test. For this family, have the following ready — the full evidence package checklist covers all 14 families:

  • Network diagrams showing external and key internal boundaries.
  • Firewall rule sets demonstrating deny-by-default, allow-by-exception.
  • A list of cryptographic modules with CMVP certificate numbers and FIPS mode settings.
  • Encryption settings for data in transit and at rest, including backups.
  • VPN configuration preventing split tunneling.
  • Key management procedures.

Frequently asked questions

Is TLS 1.2 enough for 3.13.8?

It protects data in transit, but to satisfy 3.13.11 as well the TLS implementation must use a FIPS-validated module.

Does Microsoft 365 commercial meet 3.13.11?

Encryption in Microsoft cloud services uses validated modules, but DFARS 252.204-7012 also requires FedRAMP Moderate or equivalent for CUI, and ITAR data adds further restrictions. Many defense contractors use GCC High.

Can we defer 3.13.11?

Only if CUI is already encrypted and the gap is FIPS validation. Unencrypted CUI cannot be deferred.

Does 3.13.16 require full-disk encryption?

It requires protecting the confidentiality of CUI at rest. Full-disk encryption on endpoints and encrypted storage on servers are the usual ways, and the encryption must also meet 3.13.11.

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